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ABSTRACT 
At  the  center of  world  macroeconomics  stand  the  US  budget  deficit, 
the  US  long-term  real  rate of  interest  and  the  international  value  of  the 
dollar.  This  paper discusses  the  issues  involved  in  the  role  of deficits 
in  the  recovery,  the  relation  between  deficits  and  interest  rates,  the 
costs  and  benefits to the  US  and  the  rest  of  the  world  of  a  dollar that 
is  strong,  and  the desirability and  feasibility of  enhancing,  assuring 
or accelerating  the  recovery  in Europe  by  active policy moves. 
The  paper  reviews  alternative explanations  for  long-term  real 
interest  rates  in  the  United  States which  are  almost  certainly  high. 
It  concludes  that  the  most  plausible,  and  quantitatively most  important, 
explanation  lies  in  an  anticipated  stream of  future  US  budget  deficits. 
The  effects of  anticipated deficits on  aggregate  demand  are discussed, 
first  in  a  closed  economy  model.  It is argued  that  the  current  demand 
effects of  a  fiscal  expansion  which  is  expected  to  increase through  time 
may  well  be  perverse.  Concretely,  the expected  stance of  fiscal  policy 
in  the  US  could  choke  off the  recovery. 
The  reasons  for  the  sustained appreciation of  the  US  dollar  are 
then  considered.  It is  concluded  that differences  in  fiscal  stance 
(including  expected  fiscal  stance)  between  the  US  and  Europe  have  raised 
the  equilibrium  real  exchange  rate of  the dollar.  As  long  as  these 
differences  remain,  the dollar  appreciation  is unlikely  to  be  reversed. 
This  effect  makes  the  impact  of  the  US  fiscal  stance even  more  perverse 
for  the  US.  In  Europe,  the output effects of  the  rise  in  real  interest 
rates  combined  with  a  dollar appreciation  are  ambiguous  but  there  is 
a  reduction  in  real  income  in  Europe  through  terms-of  trade  changes. 
Turning  to  European  policy options,  the paper  argues  that 
a  sufficient  margin  of  Keynesian  unemployment  exists  for  demand 
expansion  to  increase output.  Inflation  is still not  under  control  in 
some  European  economies,  but  at  Least  in Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom - ;;-
the  present  Level  of  inflation is not  such  as  to  rule out  expansionary 
policies.  Moreover,  there  would  be  no  reason  to  expect  demand  expansion 
to  Lead  to a  substantial  acceleration of  inflation at  current 
unemployment  rates. 
There  is  Little  room  for  a  pronounced  monetary  expansion  (over 
and  above  the  rebasing  of  monetary  targets to validate  any  monetary 
"blip"  which  may  already  have  taken  place)  in  Europe  at  this stage. 
There  is,  however,  room  for fiscal  expansion  in  certain  countries.  An 
explicitly  temporary and  modulated  fiscal  expansion  in  Europe  is thus 
recommended.  There  is also  a  strong motive  for  seeking  the  advantages 
of  collective action  through  coordinated expansion. CONTENTS 
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I  INTRODUCTION 
At  the  center  of  world  macroeconomics  stand  the  us  budget  deficit, 
the  us  Longterm  real  rate of  interest  and  the  international  value  of  the 
dollar.  There  is  more  than  the  ordinary  amount  of  disagreement  about  the 
role  of  deficits  in  the  recovery,  the  relation  between  deficits  and 
interest  rates,  and  about  costs  and  benefits  to  the  U.S.  and  the  rest  of 
the  world  of  a  dollar  that  is  strong.  Finally,  there  remains  sharp 
disagreement  on  the feasibility  and  desirability of  enhancing,  assuring 
or  accelerating  the  recovery  in  Europe  by  active policy  moves.  Some  of 
this  controversy  is  captured  in  a  quote  from  a  recent  assessment  by 
d  d 
.  .  1  e  Grauwe  an  Frat1ann1: 
"A  switch  in  the  US  policy  mix  - a  more  expansive  monetary  policy 
and  a  Less  expansive  fiscal  policy- could  actually  be  Less 
beneficial  to  Europe  than  the  existing  mix.  In  all  cases  Europe 
does  not  need  the  United  States  to  expand  its own  aggregate 
demand  if  she  is prepared  to  accept  the  consequences  of  this 
action.  The  inability of  EC  countries  to  agree  on  a  coordinated 
strategy  is  a  European  failure  which  cannot  be  hidden  by  making 
the  United  States  the  scapegoat  of  European  economic  problems." 
This  paper  reviews  and  assesses  some  of  these  controversies;  it 
proceeds  in  four  steps: 
The  first  is  an  assessment  of  the  current  situation.  We  conclude 
that  the  perception  of  a  us  fiscal  policy  shaping  the  characteristics of 
the  current  recovery  is  indeed  an  accurate  one. 
This  Leads  us  to  focus  on  the  characteristics of  such  a  fiscal 
policy-Led  recovery.  We  discuss  whether,  as  is often  argued,  the  Large 
deficits  may  stall or  even  choke  off  the  recovery  well  before  the  world 
economy  returns  to full  employment. 
1see  Paul  de  Grauwe  and  Michele  Fratianni  "U.S.  Economic  Policies: 
Are  They  A Burden  on  the  Rest  of  the  World?"  Unpublished  manuscript, 
Katholieke  Universiteit  Te  Leuven,  June  1983. -4-
We  then  turn  to  the  appreciation of  the dollar.  Is  it  really due 
to  US  fiscal  policy?  Is  it a  temporary  phenomenon,  likely to disappear 
as  us  trade deficits grow  larger? 
Finally,we  turn  to the  policy options  open  to  Europe.  Should 
Europe  match  the  US  deficits or  should  it react  by  increasing  instead  its 
fiscal  discipline?  Is  there  any  room  for  monetary  policy  to  supplement 
fiscal  policy?  We  argue  that  a  temporary  and  modulated  fiscal  expansion 
in  Europe  still appears  both  desirable  and  feasible. 
II  THE  OUTLOOK 
The  recovery 
The  October  forecast  by  DRI,  shown  in  Table  1,  shows  strong  u.s. 
growth  for  1983  and  1984,  leading  to  a  world  recovery.  The  forecast  shows 
a  slow,  disappointing  but  at  l~~st positive growth  performance  for  Europe. 
Table  1  DR!  Forecasts  for  Real  Growth:  October  1983 
1983  1984  1985 
World  1.9  3.6  3.0 
u.s.  3.3  5.3  3.2 
Japan  3.4  3.8  4.0 
*  Europe  0.5  1.9  2.4 
* France,  Germany,  Italy  and  United  Kingdom 
Source:  The  Data  Resources  Review  of  the  US  Economy,  October  19~3, Table  7.1 
In  contrast  to the  previous  short-lived  US  recovery  of  19~0, 
inflation is  also  sharply  down,  again  more  so  in  the  U.S.  than  in  Europe. -5-
At  the  same  time,  nominal  interest  rates are  high  both  in  the u.s. 
and  in  Europe.  Table  2  shows  a  US  term  structure of  interest  rates  that 
remains  positively  sloped,  with  a  significant  premium  of  long-term 
securities  compared  toT-bills.  At  least  at the short  end  of  the term 
structure,  these  high  nominal  rates  correspond  to  high  real  rates.  If  we 
Table  2 
3-Month 
T-bills 
8.64 
The  US  Term  Structure of  Interest  (October  7,  1983) 
6-Month 
T-bills 
8.92 
1-Year 
T-bills 
8.97 
5-Year 
T-Securities 
11.18 
Long term 
T-Securities 
11.40 
Source:  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  St.  Louis 
compute  rough  estimates of  the  short  real  rate as the 3-month  nominal  rate 
minus  inflation over  the  last  12  months,  short  real  rates  stand approximately 
at  5  % in  the u.s., 5.5  % in  the  U.K.,  and  about  3  % for  both  France  and 
2  Germany.  These  high  real  short-term  rates  reflect tight  money. 
Finally,  the  real  appreciation of the aollar  shows  no  signs  of 
abating  and  the  loss  in  competitiveness of  the u.s.  relative to  Europe  is 
significant~ Table  3  shows  export  price indices  for  manufacturing: 
Table  3  Export  price Indices  for  Machinery  and  Transport  Equipment 
(Index  of  $  export  prices, 1975  =  100) 
Machinery  Electric~l Machinery  Transport  Equipment 
G  J  us  G  J  us  G  J  us 
1979  156  133  134  146  115  121  158  141  140 
1982  137  130  178  124  107  152  140  129  188 
1982:4  134  128  178  121  ·104  153  137  122  194 
Note:  G-Germany,  J-Japan,  US-United  States, machinery  excludes  electrical 
machinery. 
Source:  UN  Monthl~ Bulletin of  Statistics, various  issues. 
2  Inflation rate:  Rate  of  change  of  the  CPI  over  the  last  12  months 
Source:  "European  Economy",  Supplement  A,  No.  8,  August-September  1983. -6-
The  stance of  policy. 
Monetary  policy.  Although  it is  clear  that  there  has  been  a  shift 
in  U.S.  monetary  policy  since  1979-1980,  money  numbers  do  not  give  a  clear 
picture.  Table  4  shows  M2  money  growth,  nominal  income  growth  and  velocity 
growth  in  the  U.S.  for  1979-1983: 
Table  4  Growth  of  us  Money,  Nominal  Income  and  Velocity 
Money  Nominal  Income  Velocity 
1979-80  6.9  8.4  1.5 
1980-81  10.5  12.9  2.4 
1981-82  9.1  5.4  -3.7 
1982-83  13.2  6.2  -6.7 
Note  :  Growth  rates  are  second  quarter  to  second  quarter. 
These  non-interest-related shifts  in  velocity, together  with  a 
monetary  targeting  philosophy,  create uncertainty  about  the  course  of 
future  monetary  policy.  If  inflation  were  to accelerate again,  the  hjgh 
growth  rate of  money  ~ight  be  blamed  for  it, forcing  the  monetary 
authorities  into  insufficient  accommodation  of  money-demand  disturbances. 
If, on  the  other hand,  shifts  in  velocity were  not  permanent  and  were  to 
undo  themselves,  would  the monetary  authorities decrease  money-growth 
sufficiently  rapidly?  Thus,  although  the  consensus  forecast  is one  of 
tight  money,  both  in  the  U.S.  and  Europe,  it  is not  one  held  with  total 
certainty. 
Fiscal  policy.  The  stance of  fiscal  policy  is  sharply  different 
in  the u.s.  and  Europe.  Whereas  in  Europe  current deficits are  large  but 
mostly  cyclical  (with  important  differences  across  countr1es>,  US  deficits 
which  were  small  are  increasing  rapidly.  Figure  1  gives  the  history  and 
forecasts  of  actual  US  deficits  from  1960  to  1990.  Deficits,  based  on  current 
legislation,  are  expected  to  continue  to the  end  of  the  80s  even  as  the 
economy  moves  toward  full  employment. Deficit 
GNP 
5.0 
3.0 
1.0 
-1.0 
-7-
Figure 1  The  U.S.  Booget De fie!  t 
(%  of GNP} -8-
Under  the  concurrent  resolution  of  June  1983  some  control  of 
spending  and  revenues  would  limit  the path  of deficits.  8ut  even  under 
these  assumptions,deficits  remain  large  throughout  the  1980s  as  shown  in 
Table  5.  From  1983  to  1985,  for  example,  the  full  employment  deficit  is 
still expected  to grow  by  nearly $40  billion. 
Table  5  us  Budget  Deficit  (Actual  deficit  as  % of  GNP) 
1982  1983  1984  1986-90  1990 
4.8  5.5  4.9  3.6  2.5 
Source  Economic  Report  of  the  President  and  Data  Resources  Review 
of  the u.s.  Econom~. 
Although  no  such  forecasts  are  available  for  European  countries, 
defi6its of  that  magnitude  appear  unlikely  for  the  EEC  as  a  whole,  and 
for  the  UK  and  Germany  in  particular. 
Interpreting  the  high  interest  rates. 
Central  to  an  analysis  of  the  recovery  is  an  assessment  of  the 
relation of  interest  rates to  policy.  The  task  is difficult,  both  because 
we  do  not  observe  expected  inflation  and  real  rates  separately,  and 
because  Long  rates  depend  not  on  current  policy  but  on  expected  future 
policy. 
We  may  think  of  nominal  long  r~tes as  the  sum  of  real  rates, 
determined  by  the equality of  full  employment  investment  and  savings,  and 
of  expected  inflation.  Thus,  the first  possibility is that  high  nominal 
rates  simply  reflect  high  expected  inflation.  As  we  have  seen,  all 
indications  are,however,that  monetary  policy  is  likely to  be  tight. 
Furthermore,  long  rates  have  been  going  up  as  inflation  was  going  down, 
and  innovations  in  Long  rates  seem  mostly  unrelated  to  innovations  in 
inflation.  There  is  Little  evidence  in  favour  of  the  Long-term  inflation 
hypothesis.  It  is  Likely  that  in  fact  long  real  rates  are  high. -9-
The  first  potential explanation  for  high  real  rates  has  been 
suggested  by  supply  side economists.  It  is that  they  reflect  an  outward 
shift  of  investment  relative to  savings.  This  outward  shift  in  investment 
would  be  due  partly to  better  investment  opportunities  and  partly due  to a 
more  favourable  tax  treatment  of  investment  and  profit.  However,  savings 
may  also  respond  to policies.  Private  savings  may  increase as  deficits 
appear,  if people  realize that  these deficits  imply  higher taxes  Later. 
Savings  may  even  shift outwards  because  of  a  high  elasticity with  respect 
to after-tax  returns  which  are enhanced  by  personal  income-tax  cuts.3  In 
this  supply  side  view,  high  real  rates  mostly  reflect  high  expected  marginal 
products  in  the  future.  We  find  some  appeal  to the  idea  that  there is an 
outward  shift  in  expected  investment  demand  at  full  employment,  but  we 
doubt  the quantitative importance  of  these effects. 
The  second  Line  of explanation  relies on  recent  changes  in  the 
stochastic  structure of  the economy.  A first  hypothesis,  advanced  among 
others  by  Nordhaus  and  based  on  earlier work  by  Modigliani  and  Shiller4 
argues  that  the post-79 operating  procedures  of  the  Fed  imply  more 
variability  in  short  rates;  this  in  turn  increases  the  Level  of  Long  rates. 
This  variance effect  is  however  difficult to  find statistically in  recent 
data.  This  first  hypothesis  Leads  to a  higher  required  rate of  return  on 
most  assets. 
A second  hypothesis  Leads  instead to a  higher  required  rate of 
return  on  bonds,  but  not  necessarily  on  other assets.  It  Looks  at  required 
returns  from  a  portfolio point  of  view:  Long-term  bonds  are  just one  asset 
held  by  investors  and  they  compete  in portfolios with  other assets, equities 
in particular.  Tne  return on  long-term  boods  relative to other assets 
depends  on  the  correlation of  bond  returns  with  the  market.  A change  in  that 
3 For  a  collection of  supply-side economics,  see  B.  Barlett  and  T.  Roth 
The  Supply  Side  Solution,  Chatham  House,  1983. 
4w.  Nordhaus,  "Interest Rate  Volatility
11
,  Cowles  Commission  Discussion 
Paper,  Yale  University,  1982.  F.  Modigliani  and  R.  Shiller "Inflation, 
Rational  Expectations  and  the Term  Structure of  Interest  Rates", 
Economica,  February  1973. 
Their  estimates  suggest  that  an  increase  of  the  standard  deviation  of 
short  rates  by  100  basis points  would  increase the  Long  rate by  15-20 
points. -10-
relationship  will  change  the  risk premium.  Recent  evidence  indicates  that 
the  correlation  with  the market  in  the  case  of  Long-term  bond  returns  has 
indeed  increased.  Because  they  now  afford  Less  of  a  hedge  than  they  did 
previously,the  required  rate of  return  has  risen.5  The  appeal  of  this 
hypothesis  is that  it may  help  explain  the  very  different  behaviour  of 
bond  and  stock  markets  in  the  Last  year,  with  bond  prices going  down  and 
stock  prices going  up.  The  increase  in  stock  prices  was  roughly  30  % in 
many  countries,  including  some  for  which  the  recovery  has  not  yet  started, 
such  as  France. 
A third  hypothesis  is  closely  related  and  also  implies  different 
movements  in  the  rates of  return  on  government  bonds  and  other assets; 
it relies  on  the effects of  anticipated  Large  deficits.  These  deficits 
increase the  relative  supply  of  government  debt.  To  induce  the public  to 
absorb  this  increased  supply  into their  portfolios the yield  on  debt  must 
rise  relative to the yields  on  other  assets.  This  increase  in  yields  is 
Larger  the  more  risk  averse  the public,  and  thus  could  in  principle  be 
Large.  These  risk  premium  hypotheses  offer  interesting explanations  for 
the  dramatic  increase  in  Long-term  rates.  We  do  not  know  how  important 
they  are  quantitatively. 
The  Last  two  explanations  are  the  standard  ones,  tight  money  and 
Loose  fiscal  policy.  The  view  that tight  money  is  responsible  for  the  high 
rates  is  certainly  plausible  for  short-term  interest  rates.  But  it does 
not  by  itself appear  satisfactory  in  view  of  the evidence  on  Long-term  rates. 
Since  the  term  structure is positively  sloped  one  would  have  to believe  in 
a  persistent  and,  indeed,  growing  imbalance  between  money  demand  and  supply. 
That  would  mean  a  continuing  conflict  between  the  Fed's  attempt  to  reduce 
nominal  money  growth  in  an  effort  to bring  inflation  ultimately  to  zero, 
and  the economy's  inability to disinflate at  a  commensurate  pace.  To  show 
a  positively  sloped  term  structure of  interest  up  to ten  years  would  require 
that  the  real  money  stock  keep  being  Low  relative to output  or,  in  other 
words,  that  the disinflation process  is  slower  and  more  painful  than  even 
James  Tobin  in  his  study  has  made  it appear.6 
5  See  z.  Bodie,  A.  Karl  and  R.  McDonald  "Why  Real  Rates  Are  So  High", 
NBER  working  paper,  1141,  June  1983. 
6  James  Tobin  "Stabilization Policy",  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic 
Activity,  1980:1. - 11-
A more  plausible  hypothesis  is that  sustained deceleration  of  money 
will  Lead  to  a  hump-shaped  term  structure.  Initial disinflation  wi.LL  raise 
interest  rates  because  of  tight  money  effects,  and  very  sharply  so.  But 
ultimately,  perhaps  after  as  much  as  three,  four  or  five  years,  credibility 
effects  come  to  be  harvested  that  allow  significantly  more  rapid 
disinflation.  At  that  point  there  comes  at  Least  a  relative easing  of  money 
and  thus  a  decline  in  interest  rates  relative  to  the  initial  Levels.  The 
absence  of  a  hump-shaped  term  structure  thus  suggests  that  tight  money 
by  itself  is  not  the  right  explanation  for  high  Long-term  interest  rates. 
The  Last  explanation  relies on  fiscal  policy.  Public  discussions 
in  the  u.s.,  at  Least  the  public  discussions  between  the  Secretary of  the 
Treasury  and  the  Chairman  of  the  Council  of  Economic  Advisors,  have 
singled out  budget  deficits  as  the  key  factor  in  explaining  interest  rates. 
As  Long  as  the  economy  is  not  at  full  employment,  the  combination  of 
deficits  and  tight  money  increases  real  rates.  At  full  employment  deficits 
reduce  total  savings  and  require  an  increase  in  the  equilibrium  real  rate. 
Current  Long  rates  simply  reflect  this anticipated  sequence  of  future  high 
short  real  rates  until  the  end  of  the  1980s.  (Current  forecasts  are 
actually  of  US  deficits of  2%  of  GNP  or  more  until  the  end  of  the 
7  century.)  This  explanation  appears  to  be  by  far  the  most  plausible  and 
the  most  important  quantitatively. 
III  CAN  THE  RECOVERY  STALL? 
We  ignore  for  the  moment  the  differences  in  fiscal  policy  between 
Europe  and  the  U.S.  and  Look  at  the  effects of  "world"  fiscal  policy  on 
the  world  recovery.  We  also  ignore  aggregate  supply  issues, that  is, 
whether  there  is  enough  Keynesian  unemployment  for  aggregate  demand 
increases  to translate  into output  increases.8  The  focus  is therefore  on 
the  effects of  fiscal  deficits on  aggregate  demand.  It  has  been  claimed 
that  future  deficits  can  affect  the  speed  and  perhaps  even  the  extent  of 
7  Data  Resources  Review  of  the  US  Economy,  October  1983. 
8  For  a  discussion  of  this,  see  Basevi,  G.,  0.  Blanchard,  W.  Suiter, 
R.  o·ornbusch  and  R.  Layard.  "Macroeconomic  Prospects  and  Policies 
for  the  European  Community",  CEPS,  Papers  No.  1, Bruxelles,  April  1983. -12-
the  recovery  - we  shall  call this the  CEA  theory.  At  the  same  time,  this 
claim  has  been  strongly  rejected  by  the  US  Treasury.  Here  is  a  quote  from 
the  key  Treasury  study:9 
"Another  version  of  the argument,  in  terms  of  real  interest  rates, 
is  rather  convoluted.  It goes  as  follows.  The  1983  deficit  does 
not  depress  the  1983  economy.  The  expected  1988  deficit  is  so 
large,  given  the expected  private demand  for  loanable  funds,  that 
it results  in  an  expected  interest  rate  in  1988  that  is too  high 
for  a  return to full  employment  in  1983.  Arbitrage  between  present 
(1983)  and  future  (1988)  interest  rates  then  keeps  1983  long-term 
interest  rates  higher  than  is  consistent  with  economic  recovery 
in  1983." 
To  clarify the  issues,  consider  a  model  of deficits  and  economic 
activity.10  Assume  that  aggregate  demand  depends  on  an  index  of  fiscal 
expansion g,  and  the  long-term  real  rate  R.  Increases  in  government  spending, 
increases  in  deficits  or  increases  in  debt  all  increase g. 
(1)  y  = eg  - fR 
The  condition of  money  market  equilibrium gives  a  relation  between 
the  log  of  real  money  (m-p),  the  short  term  nominal  rate  i  and  output  y: 
(2)  i  = hy  - k(m-p) 
The  relation  between  R and  i  is given  by  a  term  structure equation: 
(3)  R - R/R  = i  - p 
The  term  structure equation states that  the total  returns  on  long-term  and 
short-term bonds  are  equalized.  Thus  the interest  plus  the  capital gains 
•  on  Long-term  bonds,  R+R/R,  must  equal  the  interest  on  short-term  bonds. 
Integrated  forward  this  relation gives  the  Long-term  real  rate as 
a  function  of the  sequence  of  expected  future  short-term  real  rates.  The 
model  is  closed  by  an  equation  with  gives  inflation as  a  function  of  the 
9  US  Treasury,  Office of  the Assistant  Sec-retary  for  Economic  Policy, 
"Government  Deficit  Spending  and  Its  Effects  on  Prices of  Financial 
Assets",  Washington,  DC,  May  1983. 
1°  For  more  d  t  'L  d  f  th  t  k  k  t  BL  h  d  e  a1  s,  an  a  ocus  on  e  s  oc  mar  e  ,  see  anc  ar  , 
"Output,  the  Stock  Market  and  Interest  Rates", .8£R.  1981,  132-143. -13-
deviation  of  output  from  its full  employment  value,  normalized  to  equal 
zero: 
(4)  p = ~  r 
where  it is  assumed  for  simpli~ity that  nominal  money  growth  is  zero. 
Collecting  equations  (1)  through  (4)  yields: 
• 
(5)  R/R  = R(1+f(h-O())  - (h-o¢eg  +  k(m-p), 
where  we  shall  assume  h- o<~ 0. 
The  evolution  of  real  money  balances  is given  by: 
•  ( 6)  ( m-p )  =  -OC< eg  - f R  ) 
Figure  2  shows  the  dynamics  of  the  system  composed  of  (5)  and  (6), 
f  .  L  f  .  h  bl  ·  11  or  a  g1ven  va  ue  o  g.  KK  1s  t  e  sta  e  traJectory. 
Suppose  now,  in  Figure  3,  that  the  economy  is initially at  point  E, 
in  recession.  Now  a  current,  permanent  increase  in  government  spending  is 
enacted.  It  is  readily  verified  that  the  new  Long-run  equilibrium  is  at 
A'  on  K'K'.  The  economy  will  immediately  jump  to  a  higher  real  Long-term 
rate  at  E'.  The  economy  remains  initially in  recession,  but  converges  over 
time  to  the  new  steady  state at  A'  where  real  interest  rates  are  higher  and, 
with  a  flat  term  structure  and  zero  inflation, the  rise  in  the  interest 
rate  has  Led  to  a  decline  in  equilibrium  real  balances.  Note  that  in  the 
adjustment  process  the  real  rate of  interest  overshoots.  This  is the  case 
if the  fiscal  expansion  is  sufficiently  small  so  that  the  initial  level 
of  real  balances  is too  small  to  sustain  the  new  steady  state equilibrium. 
The  overshooting  of  the  real  rate ensures  continuing,  though  smaller 
recession,  that  yields deflation  and  hence,  the  required  increase  in  real 
balances.  It  is  clear  from  Figure  3  that  the  extent  of  deflation,  as 
measured  by  the  decline  in  real  balances  from  the  initial  recession  point 
to  the  steady state,is smaller.  In  this  ~ense fiscal  expansion  unambiguously 
reduces  the  required deflation  or  the  required  depth  and/or  duration  of 
recession.  It  is  also  clear  that  a  sufficiently  large  fiscal  expansion, 
the  adjustment  of  Long-term  real  rates notwithstanding,  can  move  the 
economy  immediately  from  recession  to the  new  steady state, or  even  go 
beyond  and  create  a  boom. 
11  For  the  mechanics  of  perfect  foresight  dynamics  see  the excellent 
presentation  in  D.  Begg,  The  Rational  Expectations  Revolution  in 
Economics,  Philip  Alan,  Oxford,  1982  and  Johns  Hopkins  University 
Press,  1983,  and  S.  Sheffrin  Rational  Expectations,  Cambridge 
University  Press,  1983. -14-
The  permanent,  current  fiscal  expansion  studied  in  Figure  3  serves 
as  a  benchmark  for  an  alternative exercise,  a  future,  permanent  expansion 
shown  in  Figure  4.  By  now  it  is  clear  that  the  steady  state effects  will 
be  the  same:  ultimately  the  economy  will  converge  to  point  A'.  But  the 
short-run  is  governed  by  the  fact  that  the  fiscal  expansion  is only  taking 
place  some  time  hence.  The  anticipation  of  future  expansion  and  crowding 
out  immediately  raises  Long-term  rates  somewhat  as  shown  by  the  jump  from 
E toE', but  Less  than  in  the  case  of  Figure  2.  This  increase  in  real  rates 
in  the  short  run  actually deepens  the  recession.  Once  the  fiscal  expansion 
does  take  effect  however,  the  economy  recovers  along  K'K'.  The  reversal 
of  directions  signifies  that  the  increase  in  aggregate  demand  due  to  fiscal 
expansion,  when  it does  take place,  creates  boom  conditions,  Leading  to 
inflation  and  further  increases  in  interest  rates  until  full  crowding  out 
has  been  achieved.  The  upshot  of  this example  is  the  following:  anticipated, 
future  fiscal  expansion  must,  initially, deepen  the  recession  because  it 
pus~es up  real  interest  rates  without an  offsetting direct  stimulus  to 
current  aggregate  demand. 
The  story  is  not  much  different  if  we  consider  the  case  of  an 
increasing  fiscal  expansion.  In  Figure  5  we  show  the  effects  of  a  fiscal 
expansion  that  comes  in  two  stages, one  current,  one  future.  The  immediate 
impact  is  to  move  from  E to  E',  where  output  may  be  higher  or  Lower  than 
at  E depending  on  the  relative  timing  and  dosage.  Now  follows  a  period of 
expansion  as  real  balances  grow  and  Long  rates  momentarily  decline.  But 
before  the  ultimate  expansion  there  is  another  period  of  contraction  as 
real  interest  rates  rise  again  toward  point  F. 
The  conclusion  of  our  analysis  is  that  a  fiscal  expansion  that  is 
phased  in  over  time  may  Lead  to  a  downturn  following  the  initial  stimulus 
and  expansion.  One  of  the  determining  factors  is the  gap  between  the  two 
stages,  or  put  in  another  way,  the  rate  of  increase of  fiscal  expansion. -15-
Figure  2  Adjustment  to Steady State Equilibrium -16-
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Figure  3  A  Permanent  Spending  Increase -17-
Figure  4  A  Future  Spending  Increase -18-
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Fig-ure  5  ~Two-Stage Spending  Increase -19-
The  relevance  of  these  considerations  to  the  current  recovery  is 
the  following:  real  government  spending  is  expected  to  rise  and  to  be 
financed  for  an  extended  period  by  debt  issue  rather  than  taxes.  Therefore 
real  aggregate  demand  increases  unless  there  is  a  complete  offset  through 
reduced  private  spending.  Such  an  offset  could  arise,  in  part  at  least, 
if the  anticipation  of  future  taxes  needed  to  service  the  higher  debt 
reduces  wealth  and  hence  spending.  But  as  long  as  the  public  does  not 
expect  to  pay  the  tax bill fully,  every  extra  dollar  of  debt  raises  wealth 
because  the  corresponding  present  value  of  taxes  falls  short  of  the  value 
of  the  debt  issue.  Thus  not  only  is there  no  offset  but  in  fact  private 
aggregate  demand  will  rise  along  with  government  spending  for  some  time 
until  the  tax  bill  moves  sufficiently  close. 12  Thus  overall,  a  reasonable 
case  can  be  made  that  the  conditions  needed  for  perverse  effects  through 
anticipatory  increases  in  long-term  rates  are  indeed  present. 
There  are  at  least  two  qualifications  to  the  argument  presented 
above.  The  first  is that  future  deficits  are  partly due  to  reductions  in 
taxes.  To  the  extent  that  these  tax  reductions  are  perceived  today,  they 
might  raise  aggregate  demand  today.  If  these  future  deficits  are  expected 
to  take  place  in  an  economy  which  is  by  then  at  full  employment,  this  is 
the  only  effect.  If,  however,  these  future  deficits are  expected  to  have 
an  effect  on  output  later,  perceptions  of  higher  output  and  income  Later 
may  raise  both  consumption  and  investment  today.  In  such  a  case,  although 
Long  real  interest  rates still increase,  their effect  on  aggregate  demand 
may  be  more  than  offset  by  these  anticipations  of  better  times  ahead. 
Before  we  leave  this  section,  we  note  that  we  have  concentrated 
only  on  the  potential  role  of  fiscal  policy  in  choking  off, transitorily, 
the  recovery.  It  is  clear  that  tight  monetary  policy  could  have  the  same 
effect.  This  could  happen  if, as  inflation  increases,  Volcker  finds  it 
difficult  to  accommodate  velocity  shifts  and  chooses  to  reduce  money  growth, 
with  a  European  sympathetic  move  aggravating  the  consequences. 
12  The  relation of deficits,  spending  and  debt  to  aggregate  demand  is 
studied  in  Blanchard,  "Debt,  Deficits  and  Finite  Horizons",  mimeo, 
October  1983. -20-
IV  FISCAL  POLICY  AND  THE  APPRECIATION  OF  THE  DOLLAR 
There  are  basically three  explanations  for  the dollar  appreciation: 
The  international  competitive  strength  of  the  u.s.  as  a  producer  of 
financial  assets  (safe  haven)  and  services  has  sharply  increased. 
Attention  to  manufacturing  to  identify overvaluation,  in  this  view, 
overlcoks  a  significant  change  in  other  areas  of  the  economy. 13 
The  rise  in  interest  rates  has  made  the  u.s.  a  preferred place  for 
international  portfolio  investment,  Leading  to  capital  inflows  and 
appreciation. 
The  US  Long-term  fiscal  expansion  implies  an  increase  in  current  and 
future  demand  for  US  goods  and  hence,  a  real  appreciation.  Forward-
Looking  asset  and  exchange  markets  Lead  to  increases  in  current  Long 
rates  and  exchange  rates. 
The  first  argument  may  well  be  right  and  account  for  some  of  the 
appreciation.  Shifts  in  comparative  advantage  are  among  the recognized 
determinants  of  exchange  rate  movements.  The  problem,  though,  is that  the 
u.s.  does  not  show  the  signs  of  sharply  enhanced  comparative  advantage. 
We  now  turn  to  a  more  detailed  evaluation  of  the  other  Lines  of  argument. 
High  interest  rates  as  cause  of  the dollar  appreciation. 
To  see  whether  the  argument  is acceptable,  consider  the  standard 
model  of  exchange  rate determination  in  which  securities  are perfect 
substitutes  but  goods  are  not.  Assume  further  that. pr-ices  adjust  slo~,Jly. 
From  interest  parity, 
.  ~*  •  1 = 1  +  e  we  have 
)  .  •  ·*  •*  •  •* •  (6  1-p = 1  - p  +(e+p  -p)  or  r  = r*  + q where  q  is the  real 
exchange  rate  and  r  the  real  rate  of  interest.  Equation  (6)  states that 
the  high  real-interest  country  must  be  experiencing  real  depreciation. 
13  This  view  is  most  clearly  presented  in  the  "World  Financial  Markets" 
issues  of  July,August  and  November  1983. -21-
Suppose  next  that  the equilibrium dynamics  involve  a  rate of  real 
depreciation that  is proportional  to the discrepancy  between  the  current 
and  Long-run  equilibrium  real  exchange  rate q. 
(7)  q = a(q-q) 
Combining  (6)  and  (7)  by  eliminating  q  yields  a  relation  between  real 
interest differentials and  the  real  exchang~ rate: 
- *  (8)  q  = q  -<r-r )/a 
Thus,  equation  (8)  shows  that  q  is  below q  when  the  real  interest 
differential  is positive and  above q  if the differential  is negative.  Thus 
a  rise  in  a  country's  real  interest  rate,  due  say  to tight  monetary  policy, 
Leads  to  real  appreciation.  However  it implies  a  real  exchange  rate  which 
is  low  and  depreciating,  not  Low  and  constant.  To  explain  a  sustained  real 
appreciation of  the dollar  such  as  we  have  experienced  over  the past  three 
years,  we  ~ust appeal  either to  a  succession  of  surprises or  to factors  which 
affect  both  the equilibrium exchange  rate  and  real  interest  rates.  We  now 
consider fiscal  policy  as  one  such  potential  factor. 
Fiscal  policy,  interest  rates,  and  the dollar  appreciation. 
As  we  have  seen,  the  course  of  fiscal  policy  is  very  different  in 
the  U.S.  and  in  Europe.  Fiscal  expansion  is  increasing  in  the  U.S., 
decreasing  in  Europe.  To  see  the effects of  such  a  divergence,  consider 
the  following  two-country  model: 
d  * *  .  The  sche  ules  rr and  r  r  in  F1gure  6  are the  full  employment  goods 
market  equilibrium  schedules  for  the  U.S.  and  Europe  respectively.  Aggregate 
demand  for  the output  of  each  country  depends  on  the  real  rate  of  interest, 
the  real  exchange  rate  and  fiscal  policy  in  both  countries.  A dollar 
depreciation  implies  an  increase  in  the  US  real  rate  for  equilibrium  to  be 
maintained  in  the  US  goods  market,  and  a  decrease  in  European  rates  to 
clear  the  European  goods  market.  The  rr  Locus  is  upward  sloping,  the  r*r* 
locus  is downward  sloping.  If assets  are  perfect  substitutes, equilibrium,  in 
Figure  6,  is  given  by  the  intersection  <Point  A)  of  the  two  schedules. -22-
A US  fiscal  expansion  increases  aggregate  demand  in  both  countries,  with 
a  relative increase  in  demand  for  US  goods.  Thus,  an  increase  in  interest 
rates  is  needed  to  reduce  total  demand,  an  appreciation  of  the dollar  is 
needed  to  satisfy the  shift  in  relative demands.  In  Figure  6,  rr  shifts 
*  *  *'  *'  to r'r', r  r  tor  r  and  the  equilibrium  is  A'.  Fiscal  expansion  in 
the  U.S.  Leads  to  an  appreciation of  the dollar,  an  increase  in  real 
rates  and  a  U.S.  trade deficit,  as  part  of  the  US  budget  deficit  is 
financed  by  European  savings. 
We  can  also  characterize the effects  of  an  anticipated  rather  than 
a  current  fiscal  expansion  on  the equilibrium.  This  is done  in  Figure  7. 
We  keep  the  same  specification of  goods  market  equilibrium  schedules,  but 
replace the equality of  interest  rates  condition  by  the  real  interest 
parity  condition  of  (6): 
*  •  C10)  r  =  r  +  q 
Let  the initial equilibrium  again  be  A.  The  anticipation  of  a  future  US 
fiscal  expansion  Leads  to  an  initial appreciation  of  q  from  q0  to q'  and 
a  slow  further  appreciation over  time  to the  new  equilibrium  real  exchange 
rate  q".  The  US  short  real  rate  decreases  along  rr,  the  European  rate 
increases  along  r*r*.  When  US  fiscal  expansion  actually  takes  place,  both 
rates  increase  to their  new  Long-run  value.  Extending  the analysis  to 
include  a  role  for  Long-term  rates  and  to  allow  for  sticky prices  makes 
it  unwieldy.  But  the general  implications  of  our  analysis  still go  through. 
It will  be  true that  future  changes  in  fiscal  policy  Lead  to  an  immediate 
jump  in  Long-term  real  interest  rates  in  both  countries  and  thus  to 
unemployment.  But,  at  the  same  time,  there  is  some  real  appreciation of 
the  expanding  country's  currency.  Thus,  before  the  fiscal  expansion  has 
even  taken  place the effects spill abroad  through  changes  in  Long-term 
real  interest  rates  and  through  nominal  and  real  appreciation.  The  net 
impact  of  these  spill-over effects-- gain  in  competitiveness  versus 
crowding  out  through  higher  real  interest  rates-- will  in  general  be 
ambiguous.  The  flexible  exchange  rate  thus  plays  an  important  insulating 
role,  even  if the  insulation  is  not  complete. -23-
Figure  6.  The  effects  of  US  fiscal  expansion 
r., -24-
Figure  7.  The  effects  of  an  anticipated  US  :t'iscal  expansion. 
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Comparing  these  results  which  take  into account  the  differential 
current  and  anticipated  fiscal  expansion  in  the  U.S.  and  Europe  with  those 
of  the  previous  section,  the  following  conclusions  arise: 
The  effects of  fiscal  policy  '"ill  be  even  more  perverse  for  the 
u.s.,  because  of  the  combined  effect  of  an  increase  in  Long-term  rates 
and  an  appreciation of  the  real  exchange  rate.  A recent  estimate  places 
the  US  job  losses  due  to the deterioration of  US  international  competiveness 
by  mid-1983  at  1  million,  with  a  Loss  of  real  GNP  of  1  %. 14  On  the other 
hand,  the effects are  less perverse  for  Europe  which  benefits  from  dollar 
appreciation.  The  terms  of  trade  changes,however,still  imply  a  reduction 
in  real  income  for  Europe. 
The  effects of  dollar appreciation  are  also  a  reduction  in  US 
inflation and  an  increase  in  inflation  in  Europe.  For  the  U.S.,  this 
"disinflation" effect  is estimated to amount  to 1.5  %per  year  over  the 
1980-1983  period. 
Finally,  the effects  are  not  Limited  to the u.s.  and  Europe.  LDCs 
are  largely dollar debtors  and  exporters of  primary  commodities  the  real 
prices of  which  decline  when  the dollar  appreciates.15  Since  these effects 
bring  LDCs  closer to  balance of  payments  crises they  tend to  reduce  the 
exports of all industrial  countries  and  to deteriorate the  quality of  Loans. 
Will  the dollar  appreciation  remain? 
Figures 6  or  7 suggest  that  as  Long  as  fiscal  expansion  remains  high 
in  the  U.S.  and  lower  in  Europe,  the  appreciation  of  the dollar  will  remain. 
Such  an  answer  must  however  be  qualified.  As  we  have  seen,  appreciation  is 
somewhat  paradoxically  associated  with  trade deficits.  These  trade deficits, 
howeve~ imply  both  a  transfer  of  wealth  from  the  U.S.  to other  countries, 
including  Europe,and  an  increase  in  the  foreign  holdings  of  dollar assets.16 
14  See  H.  Wallich,  Testimony  to the  Sub-committee  on  Domestic  Monetary 
_Policy,  US  House  of  Representatives,  October  5,  1983. 
15  See  R.  Dornbusch  "Interdependence  Under  Flexible  Exchange  Rates", 
IMF  Staff  Papers,  March  1983. 
16  See  C.  Wyplosz  ''Open  Economy  Dynamics  of  Fiscal  Policy",  for  a 
recent  study  which  takes  these effects  into  consideration. 
(Unpublished  manuscript,  INSEAD,  July  1983)  .• -26-
The  wealth  transfer  by  itself  Leads  to depreciation,  by  decreasing 
the  relative demand  for  US  goods.  In  Figure  6,  it tends  to  shift  back  the 
* *  rr  Locus  and  to shift  further  the  r  r  Locus.  The  effect  is ambiguous  on 
interest  rates,  unambiguous  on  q.  This  effect  is at  best  however  a  small 
and/or  a  slow  one. 
The  increase  in  foreign  holdings  of  dollar assets  may  be 
quantitatively  more  important.  We  have  assumed  so  far  that  securities 
are  perfect  substitutes  internationally.  Ithoweve~they were  imperfect 
substitutes,  interest  rate differentials, adjusted  for  expected  exchange 
rate  depreciation, would  depend  on  relative  supplies  of  securities.  Returning 
to  Figure  6,  the equilibrium  for  a  Larger  relative  stock  of  US  securities 
might  be  at  points  A"  for  the  USA,  A"'  for  Europe,  rather  than, as  the  case 
would  have  been  if securities  were  perfect  substitutes, at  A'. 
Empirical  studies  of  risk  premia  have  established  two  facts.  First, 
that  in  the  international  interest  Linkage  there definitely  appears  to be  a 
risk  premium.  International  interest differentials  do  not  differ  from 
depreciation  rates  randomly.  But  it is also  the  case that  attempts  to 
explain  the  risk  premium  in  terms  of  current  accounts  or  wealth  changes 
have  not  been  very  successful.  This  is  perhaps  not  surprising  when  we  bear 
in  mind  that  in  empirical  work  attention  has  focussed  on  public  debt  and 
cumulative  current  accounts to  the exclusion  of  the  value of  claims  to 
real  assets,  and  in  particular the  stock  market.  Of  course,  movements  in 
the  value  of  the  stock  market  swamp  the  impact  of  budget  deficits on 
wealth  and  even  more  so  the  impact  of  current  accounts.  Thus,  while  in 
principle these  relative asset  supply  effects,  and  the distribution effects 
associated  with  international  wealth  changes,  might  be  importan~ in  practice 
no  systematic  Links  to  exchange  rates  have  been  established.17 
17  See  Dornbusch,  R.  "Equilibrium  and  Disequilibrium  Exchange  Rate". 
Zeitschrift  fur  Wirtschaft  und  Sozialwissenschaften,  1982, 
J.  Frankel,  "The  Mystery  of  the multiplying  Marks",  Review  of 
Economics  and  Statistics,  19~2;  A.  Giovannini,  "Essays  on  Flexible 
Exchange  Rates".Unpublished  Ph.D.  dissertation,  M-lT,  19-83;  K.  ·Rogoff, 
"Time  Series  Studies of  the  Relationship  between  Exchange  Rates  and 
Intervention:  A review  of  the  Techniques  and  Literature".  Board  of 
Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve,  Staff  Studies  No.  132,  September  1983. -27-
Even  if these  wealth  effects exist  and  lead to  a  slow  depreciation 
over  time,  they  certainly do  not  imply  an  imminent  collapse of  the dollar. 
The  coming  large trade deficits  are predictable  and  predicted.  Their 
effects  have  already  been  taken  into account  in  the  current  value of the 
exchange  rate.  Their  realization should  come  as  no  surprise and  thus  have 
little impact  on  the  course  of  exchange  rates. 
V  EUROPE'S  POLICY  OPTIONS 
Europe  has  two  broad dimensions  of  choice:  whether  to  act  in 
coordination  with  the  U.S.  and  Japan  or  to  act  in  isolation,  and  whether 
to expand  or sit tight.  As  desirable  as  coordination  may  be,  we  see  little 
hope  for it to actually  take  place:  the  main  source of  problems,  US  fiscal 
policy,seems  out  of  control  and  probably  is touchy  in  an  election year. 
Thus  the  immediate  question  is what  Europe  can  do  by  itself.  There  are 
two  different questions.  The  first  is whether  there  is a  need  for 
expansionary  policy,  over  and  beyond  what  an  export-Led  recovery  can 
provide.  The  second  is, if expansionary  policy  is  indeed  desirable,  whether 
there  is much  room  for  fiscal  policy  in  Europe. 
Is  a  faster  recovery  desirable? 
Table  6  Looks  at  inflation and  unemployment  rates  in  Europe.  In 
this  comparison  Germany  and  the  UK  appear  clearly  as  hard  currency 
countries.  Inflation  has  fallen  to  very  low  Levels,  but  the  costs  of 
stabilization  show  immensely  high  unemployment  rates. 
For  these  countries  only  the  most  extraordinary  circumstances 
would  recommend  opposition to~  expansion.  But  that  Line  of  argument 
assuredly  does  not  hold  for  all  EC  countries.  The  averages  show  that 
unemployment  is  high,  but  inflation  remains  a  very  serious  problem,  far 
from  being  under  control. -28-
Table  6  Inflation and  Unemployment  Rates  in  Europe 
Unemployment  Rate  Inflation Rate 
1982  1983:II  1982  1983* 
U.K.  11.2  12.2  8.6  4.2 
Germany  6.8  8.5  5.3  2.5 
EC  9.6  1  o. 7  11.0  8.4 
*  Last  12  months  as  of  July  1983 
Source  :  European  Economy,  Supplement  A,  No.  8,  August-September  1983. 
Thus,  only  under  the most  extraordinary  circumstances  would  Germany 
or  the  U.K.  not  be  justified in  seeking  expansion  through  demand  policies. 
Two  such  extraordinary  circumstances  come  readily  to mind:  first,  that 
policies do  not  work  or,  second,  that  they  have  very  costly side effects 
that  on  balance  make  them  undesirable. 
Demand  policies  would  fail  to  work  if major  sectors of  the 
European  economy  were  already  in  a  situation of  classical  unemployment. 
This  is  a  situation where  the  real  wage,  rather  than  the  level  of  demand, 
is  the  obstacle to  expansion.  We  have  already discussed this possibility 
elsewhere,  and  have  argued  that  there  is a  sufficient  margin  of  Keynesian 
18  unemployment  for  aggregate  demand  to affect  output.  Even  if economies 
face  a  mix  of  classical  and  Keynesian  unemployment,  this argues  for  the 
use  of  supply  and  demand  policies, not  against  the  use  of  demand  policies. 
The  obvious  side effect  of  a  faster  recovery  is  increased 
inflation.  Here,  we  shall  also  repeat  what  we  have  developed  at  more 
length  in  an  earlier  report:  econometric  evidence  suggests  a  relation 
between  the  level  of  unemployment  and  wage  inflation,  with  at  most  a  small 
effect  of  rates of  change  in  unemployment.  There  is no  reason  to expect 
a  substantial  acceleration of  inflation at  current  unemployment  rates. 
18  Basevi,  G.,  0.  Blanchard,  W.  Buiter,  R.  Dornbusch  and  R.  Layard, 
op.cit. -29-
Can  fiscal  policy  be  used? 
We  see  Little  room  for  a  pronounced  monetary  expansion  at this 
stage.  A temporary  blip  in  money,  that  is a  once  and  for all  increase  in 
nominal  money,  would  decrease  short  real  rates,  and  as  a  result decrease 
the  size of  budget  deficits; this  would  in  turn  improve  the  short  and 
medium  term  fiscal  outlook  and  allow  for  more  room  in  fiscal  policy, 
besides  the direct  beneficial  effects  on  aggregate  demand.  Credibility 
problems  associated  with  such  a  policy  are,however,major.  It  is  certainly 
the  case that  in  the u.s.  the  actual  growth  of  money  has  been  significantly 
above  inflation targets  without  endangering,  so  far,  the belief  in  the 
maintenance of  monetary  responsibility that  was  inaugurated  in  1979-80. 
In the  same  way  the easing  of  money  in  1982-83  in  Germany,  accomp~nying ~he 
US  move  toward  a  Less  punishing  stance of  monetary  policy,  has  not  Led 
to a  collapse of  confidence  in  superior  inflation performance.  But  it 
surely  would  be  wrong  to  expect  that  a  continuation,  on  a  significant 
scale,  of  nominal  money  growth  above  target  ranges  could  be  seen  by  the 
public  as  anything  but  a  change  of  the  basic  stance of  monetary  policy  in 
the  face  of  depressed activity.  Such  an  interpretation might  well  shjft the 
growth  inflation trade-off,  certainly  if it  Led  to  currency depreciation. 
We  therefore  believe it is entirely appropriate to  rebase  monetary  targets, 
validating the "blip" that  has  taken place.  It would  certainly  be  quite 
unsound  now  to move  money  growth  back  within  the original targets  simply 
because  an  incipient  recovery  suggests  that  the economy  can  afford 
monetary  tightening.  But  we  also  believe that  going  much  further  than 
such  a  rebasing  could  have  adverse effects  on  credibility, even  recognizing 
that  this  is  a  very  elusive concept. 
The  statement  that  fiscal deficits  in  Europe  are  mostly  cyclical 
must  now  be  justified and  qualified.  In  an  earlier  report,  we  showed  that 
the inflation adjusted,  cyclically adjusted deficit  for  the  EEC  as  a  whole 
for  1982  was  actually negative;  the increase  in  real  interest  payments 
for  1983  suggests  a  small  positive cyclically adjusted deficit.18  To 
understand the difference between  these  numbers  and  the perception  in 
18  Basevi,  G.,  o.  Blanchard,  w.  Suiter,  R.  Dornbusch  and  R.  Layard, 
op.cit. -30-
Europe  of  extremely  Large  deficits, it is  instructive to  Look  at  the 
numbers  for  Italy,  which  has  a  public  sector deficit  of  17%  of  GNP. 
This  is  done  in  Table  7. 
Table  7  The  deficit  in  Italy 
1982  1983  (forecast) 
Public  sector deficit, % of  GNP 
1 •  Unadjusted  16.9  16.9 
2.  Inflation  adjustment  8.6  7.9 
3.  Cyclical  adjustment  2.2  2.9 
4.  Government  investment  3.8  4.1 
1  -(2+3+4)  2.3  2.0 
Percent  of  GOP. 
Source  :  Francesco  Giavazzi:  "A  Note  on  the  budget  deficit  and  real 
interest  rates  in Italy, October  1983. 
Thus  for  both  1982  and  1983,  Italy's full  employment  deficit  is 
only  2%  rather  than  the  much  publicized  17  %.  The  situation is however 
not  so  favourable  for  other  countries:  Belgium  and  Denmark  actually  have 
Large  cyclically-adjusted deficits  and  Little  room  for  fiscal  expansion. 
These  figures  suggest  that  although  fiscal  expansion  is feasible  for 
Europe  as  a  whole,  it has  to  be  modulated  amoog  countries. 
Ignoring  for  the  moment  issues  of  timing  and  distribution among 
European  countries,  what  are  the effects of  a  European  fiscal  expansion 
Likely  to  be?  Using  the  framework  developed  in  the previous  section,  and 
by  symmetry,  we  could  expect  an  appreciation  of  European  currencies,  a 
further  increase  in  Long  rates  and,  barring  perverse  timing  effects,  a 
faster  recovery  in  Europe. 
There  is however  a  differing  view  of  what  might  happen,  known  as 
Dr.  Gleske's  asymmetry.  It  is that  while  US  fiscal  expansion  Leads  to 
dollar  appreciation,  German  fiscal  expansion  Leads  to  mark  depreciation. -31-
Mark  depreciation  is unacceptable  because  of  its inflationary  impact  and 
thus  fiscal  expansion  cannot  be  used.  Under  what  conditions  could  such 
an  asymmetry  arise?  Again  relying  on  the analysis  of  the previous  section, 
this  could  happen  if most  of  a  German  fiscal  expansion  translated  into a 
decrease  in  the  relative world  demand  for  German  goods,  or  if the two 
depreciation-inducing  factors,  wealth  and  portfolio effects,dominated 
good  market  effects.  The  issue  can  only  be  settled empirically;  there  is 
no  good  a  priori  case  for  the  asymmetry.  Another  Line  of  argument  could 
be  that  Looser  fiscal  policy  might  be  interpreted  as  a  sign of  future 
monetization,  rekindle  inflationary expectations  and  possibly  Lead  to 
depreciation.  Loose  US  fiscal  policy  was  not  interpreted  in  this  Light; 
there  is  little reason  to think  that  German  fiscal  policy  would  be 
interpreted differently. 
This  Last  factor,however,argues  for  an  explicitly  temporary  fiscal 
expansion.  There  are  other  reasons  as  well:  Section  2  has  made  clear  that 
the  time  path  of  fiscal  expansion  is  very  important.  A Large  but 
decreasing  fiscal  stimulus  will  have  more  effect  than  a  smaLL  and  increasing 
one.  It  will  have  Less  effect  on  long  rates.  By  the  same  token,  it is 
likely  to  have  Less  effect  on  the appreciation  of  the dollar. 
The  objection that  any  expansionary  fiscal  move,  even  though 
planned  to  be  transitory,  ultimately  must  almost  inevitably deteriorate 
the  public  sector  budgets  even  further  is  a  serious  one.  This  is  so 
because  tax  cuts  or government  programs  are  "sticky"  even  if they  were 
initially conceived  as  transitoFy.  Moreover,  because  they  Lead  to  debt 
finance  ,  they  raise  future debt  burdens  relative to  income  and  thus 
deteriorate  the  future  fiscal  outlook.  This  consideration  is valid  even 
if there  is  no  precise  benchmark  for  what  sound  debt/GNP  ratios might  be. 
The  consideration  is all the more  valid  the  higher  the  real  rate  of  interest 
relative to  the  growth  rate of  output. -32-
Chasing  deficits  by  fiscal  tightening,however,  produces  depression, 
not  prosperity.  Table  8  tells the  simple  story of  where  policies are  taking 
the  European  economy  at  present: 
Table  8  EC  Unemployment  and  Changes  in  Cyclically-Adjusted  Budgets 
Unemployment  Rate  (%) 
Change  in  Cyclically-
Adjusted  Budget  Surplus 
(%  of  GNP) 
*  estimate 
**  forecast 
1982 
9.4 
0.7 
19~3  *  1984 
10.4  10.9 
0.5  o.~ 
source:  European  Economy,  No.  18,  November  1983,  Tables  4.1  and  5.6 
** 
Most  certainly,  at  a  minimum,  this  is  not  the year  to  remove 
deficits.  On  the  contrary,  there  should  be  transitory net  stimulus  of 
the  economy. 
Once  it is  recognized  that  expansion,  not  restriction,  is  called 
for  there  remains  the  issue of  whether  countries  should  and  can  act 
individually  or  whether  coordination  is  called  for.  It  is  now  well 
recognized  that  the  inflatio~growth trade-off  facing  any  single  country 
is  highly  unfavourable.  This  is  the more  so  the  poorer  a  co~ntry•s 
financial  "repuration".  Individually,  countries therefore  perceive trade-
offs that  limit  expansion-more  severely  than  is the  case  for  them  acting 
as  a  group.  Since  no  European  country  can  claim  that  it does  not  have  a 
grave  unemployment  problem  there  is a  strong  motive  for  seeking  the 
advantages  of  collective action  through  coordinated expansion. 
The  remaining  argument  concerns  the precise structure of 
1~  coordination.  We  shall  repeat  here  what  we  suggested  in  an  earlier  report: 
18  Basevi,  G.,  0.  Blanchard,  W.  8uiter,  R.  Dornbusch  and  R.  Layard, 
op.  cit. -33-
"There  is  a  simple  principle that  might  help  set  a  benchmark  for 
minimum  expansion.  Suppose  only  one  group  of  countries  in  the  EEC  expands, 
while  the  others  do  not  take  any  fiscal  initiative.  The  expanding  group 
would  incur  budget  and  current  account  deterioration,  but  the  non-
expanding  group  would  have  improved  budget  and  external  balances.  A 
natural  benchmark  for  minimum  expansion  might  then  be  oriented  toward  a 
fiscal  expansion  that  ensured,in  weak  currency  countries,  a  zero  change 
in  the  budget  or  a  zero  change  in  the  current  balance.  In  this  manner, 
the  weak  countries  neither  serve as  Locomotive  of  expansion,  nor  are  they 
a  drag  on  the  expansion". -34-
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